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WORK , WELFARE, AND FAMILY
STRUCTURE: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?
ABSTRACT
Welfare reform has once again made its way to the top of the domestic policy agenda, While
part of the motivation behind current reform efforts is fiscally driven, there is also an interest in
making significant changes that address two prominent criticisms of the existing system of public
assistance programs in the United States. First, the system has significant, adverse work incentives.
Second, the system discourages the formation of two-parent families and is responsible in a major
part for the high, and rising, rates of female headship and out-of-wedlock birth rates. This paper
explores the validity of these criticisms using the available empirical evidence and, in turn, evaluates
the impact of various reforms to the system. The programs examined include Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, Food Stamps and Medicaid programs. The paper relies on evidence based on
three sources of variation in welfare policy: cross-state variation, over time variation, and
demonstration projects at the state level. The paper concludes that current reforms aimed at reducing
female headship and nonmarital births such as “family caps,” eliminating benefits for teens, and
equal treatment of two-parent families are unlikely to generate large effects. Changes to implicit tax
rates and benefit formulas may increase work among current recipients, but overall work effort may
not be affected. These predictions should be accompanied by a word of caution. Many of the
proposed changes have never been implemented at the state or federal level and require out of
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and NBER1. Introduction
WeWae reform has onu againmade itsway to the top of the domestic policy agenda. While
part of the motivation behind current reform efforts is fiscally dnve~ there is also an interest in
making significant changes that address two prominent criticisms of the existing system of public
assistanceprograms inthe United States. First, the system has significant, adverse, work incentives.
It leads to low work effort among recipients which in tuq contributes to long term poverty,
Secon& the systemdimurages the fodon oftwo-parent ties and isresponsible in a major part
for the him and rising rates of femaleheadshipand out-of-wedlock birth rates. This paper explores
the validityofthese criticismsusingthe availableempiricalevidence and, in turn, evaluates the impact
of various reforms to the system.
“Welfare” most commody refers to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
pro- which provides wh ~stance to low incomeHes with children. More broadly, welfare
corresponds to the set of fder~ state, and local, means tested transfer programs. The main goal of
pubficassistanceprograms isto increase income and reduce poverty among the disadvantaged. The
evidence based on comparisons of pre- with post-transfer income shows that these programs have
had success meeting that goal (Danziger and Weinberg 1994). This transfer of income, however,
generates potential efficiencylossesthough its distortions to individual behavior such as labor supply
and My structure decisions. While means tested programs in the United States are also provided
to the elderly and the disabled, the concern over adverse work and ftily structure incentives is
dir-cd primarilyat programs servinglow inmme fdes with children.1 In addition to cash benefits
through the AFDC progrq low-income ftiies with children are eligible for in-kind benefits such
asFood Stamps, medid coverage through the Mdlcaid program, and housing subsidies. Working
poor Wes can also receive tigs subsidiesthrough the tax system with the Earned Income Tax-2-
Credit (El’TC). Whilethere are other smaller programs serving low income ftilies, this review will
focus on the above mentioned major programs.2
The disincentives towards work md family structure decisions are a direct result of the
structure ofbenefit and eligibilityrulesfor these programs. First, most programs are structured such
that they provide a basic benefit level, called a guarantee, which is reduced as a family’searnings
increases. The rate at which benefits are reduced, the benefit reduction rate (BRR), represents an
implicittax rate on earned inmme. Statutory tax rates in the AFDC program are 67 to 100 percent.
When combined with other programs, cumulative tax rates can be over 100 percent. Static labor
supply theory suggests that welfme benefits, with their combination of a
reduction rate, lead unambiguouslyto lower levels of work effort than would
guarantee and benefit
exist in the absence of
such a program. Second, welftie programs have historically restricted eligibility to single parents
an& despite recent expansions for two-parent ftiies, the system continues to favor single parents.
The system therefore, provides incentives to form single parent families and have children out-of-
wedlock.
Before evaluatingthe magnitudeofthese disincentiveeff~s, I will provide some background
on the system of public assistance programs in the U.S. and the population they serve, Section 2
describesthe publicassistanceprograms for low-income families and illustrates the magnitude of the
Cumdativetax rates W by these families. Section3 pr~ts data on poverty, ftily structure, and
the characteristicsof welfarerecipients. Section4 discussesthe expected effects of welfare programs
on work and tiy structure decisions and sections 5 and 6 summarize what we have learned about
the magnitude of these disincentive effects. Section 7 summarizes key elements of past and current
efforts at reforming welfare discusses the likelyimpact of various reform. Section 8 concludes.-3-
2. Description of Major Public Assistance Programs
2.1 Eligibility and Benefits
Participation in most public assistance programs in the U.S. requires satisfing two types of
eligibility conditions: resource restrictions (means tests) and categorical restrictions. Each of the
programs considered here has an income test, and all programs except the EITC also have an asset
test. In addition, there are categorical restrictions for many of the programs, often limiting receipt
to single parents with children.
The AFDC program was establishedin 1935 as part of the Social Security Act and eligibility
and benefit determinatio~ and finding are shared between the federal and state govermnents.
Eligibilityfor AFDC requires that the household contains at least one child who is less than 18, and
must have sufficiently low income and asset levels. The income test requires that ftiy monthly
income, tier allowable deductions for work expenses and child care, fall below a state determined
maximumbenefitlevelwhich varies by ftily size.3 Eligibility has historically been limited to single
parent (typically female headed) families beeause of the additional requirement that the child be
deprived of support due to death, incapacity, or absence of a parent. Starting in 1961 with selected
state expansions, and eventually mandated with passage of the 1988 Family Support Act (FSA),
states have expanded
(AFDC-UP) programs.
eligibility to two-parent ftilies by setting up AFDC Unemployed Parent
However, the system still favors single parents as two-parent ftilies must
also satisfi a work history requirement and can not work more than 100 hours per month while on
welfare. 4 All AFDC recipients are categorically eligible for Food Stamp benefits and government
financed medical services under the Medicaid program.
AFDC benefitsare calculatedm the dtierence betwwn the state determined maximum benefit
level and net family income. The benefit levels vary tremendously across states, For example, in-4-
1993, monthlymaximumbenefitsfor a singlemother andtwo childrenranged from $607 in California
and $658 in Vermont to $164 in Alabama and $120 in Mississippi (U,S. House of Representatives,
1994), A standard deduction for work expenses of $90 per month is deducted from earnings in
calculatingbenefit payments. In the first four months of working while on AFDC, an additional $30
plus one-third of remaining earnings is deducted from gross income. This is the so called “30 and
1/3” rule. Thus for every $1 increase in earned income over the allowable deductions, benefits are
reduced by 67 cents. After four months the one-third deduction is discontinued and benefits are
reduced one-to-one with an increase in earnings, Thus the statutory tax rate on earned income, or
benefit reduction rate (13RR),for AFDC recipients is 67 or 100 percents
The EITC is a refinable tax credit which when it was introduced in 1975, was designed to
OW the social security tax for low-income familieswith children. In order to receive the credit, a
Hy must contain a qufied child, have earnings below a specified level, and file a tax retum.b In
1994,the EITC was availablefor familieswith earningsup to $23,755 for families with one child, and
$25,300 for fties with two or more children. There is no difference in the generosity of the credit
for one and two parent families and about 60 percent of recipients are single parent families (Eissa
and Lleb~ 1993). The amount of the EITC depends on whether earnings lie in the subsidy, flat,
or phaseout range of the credit. For example, consider a familywith two children in 1994. For this
My, the subsidyrange covers earnings up to $8,425, over which the subsidy equals 30 percent of
earningsgenerating a maximumcredit of $2,538. h the flatrange, covering earnings between $8,425
and $11,000, the ftiy receives the maximum credit. In the phaseout range, the subsidy is reduced
by 17.68 cents for each additionaldollar inearningssuchthat the credit is filly phased out at earnings
of $25,300. The credit is smaller for familieswith one child.
The Food Stamp program is a federal program which began in 1964, and eligibility and-5-
benefits are uniform across the lower 48 states and the District of Columbia. The Food Stamp
Program is the ordy program considered here which is extended to all needy families, regardless of
the presence of childrenor other ftiy structure requirements. Like AFDC, ftilies must satis@ an
asset test, and a net and gross income test. Net income must not exceed the poverty line, equal to
$11,892 in 1994 for a single parent with two childre~ and gross income must not exceed 1.3 times
the poverty line. Food Stamp benefits are equal to maximum Food Stamp benefits, which varies by
fdy size, less30 percent of ftily net income. Net income includes AFDC benefits, and there are
deductions for work expenses, child care expenses, and shelter expenses. Because AFDC income is
taken into account in calculating Food Stamp benefits, families living in states with low AFDC
benefits receive higher Food Stamp grants thereby reducing the cross-state variation in combined
benefits. Ln1993, the maximum monthly Food Stamp benefit for a single mother and two children
was $295. Food Stamp benefits are adjusted each year for changes in the cost of food.
The Medicaid progra~ which was started in 1965, is ajoint federal-state program which is
available primarily to recipients of cash assistance including families with children receiving AFDC
and the low income aged, blind and disabled receiving Supplemental Security Income (SS1).
Benefits inmost programs are phased out as income rises. Medicaid benefits, however, are typically
provided in fill, or not at all. Tying Medicaid benefits to program recipiency leads to a “notch”
whereby benefits are lost in their entirety when eligibilityfor cash benefits ends, However, recent
expansions in the program have severed the link between cash benefit receipt and eligibility for
Medicaid thereby downplaying the importance of the notch. First, the FSA mandates “transition
bentits” whereby AFDC recipients losing eligibilitybecause of increased earnings receive Medicaid
for and additional 12 months. Second, beginning in 1984, Medicaid eligibility was expanded to
pregnant woman and childrenwith incomeinexwss of the AFDC limits. All states are now required-6-
to extend benefits to all children under the age of six with family income below 133 percent of the
poverty line,andto allchildren born after September 1, 1993 with family income below the poverty
line. When the expansions are filly phased i%all poor children will be covered.’
Each of the programs discussedabove are entitlement programs. That is, if a family satisfies
the eligibilitycondition(s) forthe pro= then theywillreceivebenelits according to the appropriate
benefitformula, Low income housing benefits in the U.S. are not an entitlement -- while all ~C
recipients are categorically eligible, ordy about 30 percent receive benefits (U.S. House of
Representatives, 1994). Housing assistance typically takes the form of either public housing or
subsidized, private (Section 8) rental housing.g For both programs, families must satis~ both asset
and income tests with inmme tests set by the local housing authority. Once eligibility is determined,
a family is placed on a waiting list. Queues can be quite long, more than two years in most urban
areas (Painter 1995). For both types of housing aid, some contribution to rent is required from the
family and the subsidy is the difference between the fair market rent of the unit and the family’s
contribution.
Table 1su~ severalkey featuresofthe mainwelfare programs covered in this review:
AFDC, Food Stamps, Medicaidandthe EITC. The table shows the variation in the level of finance,
level of provision, and eligibility requirements across these programs. These figures show that
Medicaid is the most expensive program for familieswith childre~ with a total expenditure of 32.1
billion dollars in 1993. AFDC is smnd with 25 million dollars.
The last 30 years have enmmpassed great changes in our system of public assistance, Table
2 presents expenditures and participation in these programs for selected yews during 1960 to the
present. The table mnsists of three panels. The firsttwo present total participation and expenditures
in these programs. The last panel presents figures on the percent of benefits going to ftilies with-7-
childrenfor selectedyears duringthis period. The table showsthat a major trend in welfare programs
isthe increased importance of in-kind benefits. In 1960, 85 percent of benefits were in cash which
decreased to 27 percent in 1975and 18percent in 1993. The rd mst of the AFDC program reached
a peak in the early 1970s and has remained ftirly constant since. Among the public assistance
programs considered here, the Medicaid program is both the largest and the one with the highest
growth rate. The cost ofthe Medicaid program, in 1993 dollars, has increased from $54.9 billion in
1985to $132 billion in 1993. However, while families with dependent children represent about 71
percent of allMedicaid recipients, expenditures for this group represent ordy 29 percent of the total
expenditures (U.S. House of Representatives 1994). The cost of the EITC program has increased
dramaticallyinthe last 10years due to majorexpansionsin 1986, 1990, and 1993. These expansions
have increased the value of the credit as well as the range of incomes covered by the credit. The
maximum credit for a family with two childre~ in current dollars, has increased from $550 in 1986
to an expected $3560 in 1996. During the same period, the upper limit on earnings has increased
from $11,000 to $28,524. Mer aaunting for changes in prices, the maximum credit has increased
over 350 percent over this period and the income limit has increased by 86 percent. Table 2 shows
that the number of ftiles receiving the EITC is now about three times as large as the number of
families receiving AFDC. Under current law, the cost of the EITC is expected to be over one and
one half times as large as federal spending on the AFDC program by 1996 (U.S. House of
Representatives, 1994). The Food Strep caseload has grown fairly steadily over the past 20 years,
While the cost of the program is now about equal to the AFDC progr~ ftilies with dependent
childrenrepresent less than 60 percent of the Food Stamp caseload (U.S. House of Representatives
1994).
Figure 1showshow total expenditureson publicassistanceprograms have changed over time-8-
as a percent of GNP.9 Between the late 1960s and the mid 1970s resources on means tested
programs increased, however, since then they have remained ve~ stable at just under 4 percent of
GNP. The increase in cost of these programs in the last few years of the fi~re is primarily due to
growth inMedicaid where non-medicalmeanstested programs have increase ordy slightly at the end
of the period, For compariso~ the figure also presents the total cost of social insurance programs,
such as Social Security,Medicare andUnemploymentCompensatio~ as a percent of GNP. The cost
of these programs is almost twice the amount spent on the poor.
2.2 Implicit Tax Rates Faced by hw Income Families
The above discussion suggests that poor families with children are eligible for a patchwork
ofbenefit andtax programs. In all programs except Medicaid, the benefit a ftiy receives depends
on their level of earnings, which in turn depends on their work effort. As a first step toward
understanding the incentives to work for program participants, this section presents information on
earnings, benefits, and income which is attainable at different wage rates and hours of work for
representative welfare recipients. These incentives are summarized by implicit tax rates on earned
income which reflect by how much disposable income increases with an increase in work effort,
Because a fdy may be participatinginmanyprograms sirm.dtaneously, one has to consider the taxes
faced for the combined set of programs.
It should be emphasized that these implicit tax rates are otiy relevant for work which is
reported to the case worker. In fq highmarginaltax rates for this group may increase the incentive
to conceal earnings from the authorities. While the available evidence is somewhat anecdotal, it
suggests that a large fraction of AFDC recipients are working and not reporting the income to the
authorities @din and Jencks, 1992).10
The earnings, income, md tax rates reported here are calculated using a benefit and tax-9-
simulationprogram whichtakes into account federal and state tax and transfer programs, In order
to illustrate the magnitude of the tax rates faced by public assistance recipients, I have simulated
benefits, taxes and disposable income for representative families. The simulation model calculates
payrolltaxes, state and fderd income taxes, and benefits received from AFDC, and Food Stamps.11
To do the calculation, we need
children, the state of residence,
to make assumptions about the hourly wage rate, the number of
and the amount of child care and work expenses. Each of the
simulations are calculated assumed that the family consists of a single mother with two children,
where the mother incurs child care costs equal to 20 percent of earnings, and other work expenses
amounting to 10 percent of earnings.12 All taxes and transfers are calculated under 1993 law.
Sirmdationsare conducted under alternative assumptions concerning the woman’s hourly wage, her
state of residence, and which statutory BRR the woman faces in the AFDC program. These
estimates are similarininstruction and magnitude to others in the literature such as recent analyses
by Dickert et al (1994) and Giannarelli and Steuerle (1995).
Table 3 presentsthe annualincome,expenses,and averagetax rates assuming that the woman
livesin CMomi~ can eam $5.00 per hour, and that she is in the first four months of work and faces
the 30 ad 1/3rule.13 If the woman is not working, she has annual disposable income of $8,639 of
which $7,284 comes from AFDC and the remainder from the Food Stamp Program. If she chooses
to work part time at $5.00 per hour, she has earnings of $5,200 but her disposable income increases
by ordy $2,449. Increasing her work effort generates an EITC of $1,014 but she incurs child care
expenses, work expenses, and a reduction in her AFDC payment of $1,467 and in her Food Stamp
benefitof $340. Thisresults ina tax rate for goingfrom no work to part time work of 52.9 percent.14
The same woman considering fill time work would face a tax rate of 64,3 percent for going from
no work to fill time work and a tax rate of 75.8 percent for going from part time to fill time work.-1o-
There are severalpoints to make inthistable. First, the tax rates are very high. To put these
in some perspective, in the absence of the implicittax rates imposed by the AFDC and Food Stamp
programs, tax rates for thiswoman would be about 18percent for part-time work and 23 percent for
fill-time work. Second, they are somewhat lower than the statutory rate of 67 percent due to the
allowable deductions. Third, the marginal tax rate (MTR) from going from no work to part time
work is lower than that going from part-time to fill-time because of the standard deductions. 15
Lastly, these tax rates are an underestimate of the actual rates because they do not take into account
housingbenefits and Medicaid. Until the recent expansions, losing AFDC eligibility would lead to
a loss ofMedicaid as we~ addingto the heady hightax rate, However, the transitional benefits and
expansions in coverage for children together reduce the impact of Medicaid on tax rates, at least in
the short run.
The presence of the 30 and 1/3 rule significantlyreduces the tax rates faced by low income
families. Figure 2(a) presents disposableinwme as a finction of hours worked for the case presented
inTable 3. Figure 2(b) recalculatesdisposableincome for the identical family except we assume that
the mother has been working for over four months, and thus faces the 100 percent statutory tax rate
inthe AFDCprogram. The figuresseparate inmme into net earnings,EITC, AFDC, and Food Stamp
benefits, Net earnings are gross earnings less all expenses and taxes other than the EITC. The
difference between Figures 2(a) and 2(b) is striking. Without the 30 and 1/3 rule, in Figure 2(b),
disposableincome is almostunchanged between 5 and 40 hours of work and the tax rate for moving
from no work to part timework is75 percent, The MTR of moving from part-time to fill-time work
is99 percent. A woman mntemplating leaving welfare to work fuU-time(at the $5.00 hourly wage)
would see an increase in disposable income of ordy $1400 representing ordy’a 16 percent increase
over attainable income while not working.-11-
C~omia was chosenbecause it mntains the nation’s largest welfwe populatio~ accounting
for about 17 percent of the AFDC caseload (U.S. House of Representatives, 1994). California is
unu@ however, because AFDC benefit levels are among the highest in the country. As shown in
Figure 2, the woman working fill-time for $5.00 per hour is still eligible for AFDC benefits, even
when the BRR is 100 percent. These high implicit tax rates, however, are faced by recipients in all
states although the exact magnitude depends on many things including the state’s benefit level (and
the amount paid for child care and other work expenses). To illustrate the possible differences
between the states, Figure 3 repeats the exercise assuming that the woman lives in Illinois. In 1993,
our mother and two children could receive an AFDC grant of $367 per month in Illinois, which is
about average for the U.S., mmpared to $607 inCtiornia. A comparison of Figures 2 and 3 shows
that potential income is lower in Illinois but a higher food stamp grant partially makes up for the
lower AFDC grant. The samegeneralpattern foundinFigure 2 also is evident in these figures. With
the 30 and 1/3rule, disposableinmme increasesmodestly with increases in earnings, and without the
30 and 1/3 rule, iname is quite flat as a finction of hours worked until the family earns its way off
AFDC, which in this case occurs at 30 hours per month,
To illustratehow tax ~ varyfor womenwith ~ent wage opportunities, Table 4 presents
tax rates for our ftily in California at various wage levels. Increasing the wage generally leads to
highertax rates ~ciated with part timework but lower tax rates for fill time work. As wage rates
rise,the break-even levelof hours of work d~, increasingthe marginal tax rates at lower levels
of hours. The table also shows the importance of the EITC. The top panel of the table presents tax
rates based on the 1996levelsfor the E~C, whenthe current expmsions will be filly phased in. The
lower panelpresents tax ratm inthe absenceof anEITC. The 1996EITC (where the maximum wage
subsidy is 40 percent) decrwes tax rates by about 30-50 percent at the lower wage levels. This-12-
represents significant reductions for low wage workers. 16
3. Facts on Welfare, Poverty, Work and Family Structure
l Female he&dfamilies are becom”ng increasingly more commoti
Figure 4 shows female headed households as a percent of all families with children over the
period 1968 to 1993. In 1968, about 8 percent of white families with children were headed by a
single mother, while in 1993 almost 17 percent of white families with children were female headed
households. These trends are even more dramaticforblack fties where the rate of female headship
increased from about 30 percent in 1970 to over 50 percent in 1993.
Also si~cant isthe dramatic increase in nonrnarital birth rates, measured as the number of
births to unmarried women per 1000 unmarried women ages 15-44. Figure 5 shows that the
nonmarital birth rate has more than doubled over the period 1960-1992 from 20 to 42 per 1000
unmarried women. These trends are occurring, to some degree, among women of all reproductive
ages and in all racial and ethnic groups (Ventura et al 1995). This steady increase in birth rates
among unmarried women is particularly striking since overall birth rates for all women, as shown in
Figure 5, have shown onlymodest increasessincethe 1970s. In 1960 the birth rate of all women was
almost sii timesthe rate for unmarried wome~ yet that ratio has fallen to less then 2 to 1by the end
of the period. This increase is particularly striking for blacks where in 1993 filly 70 percent of d
birthsare to unmarried mothers (Ventura 1995). Changesinthe ratio of nonmarital births to all births
(the nonmaritalbirth ratio) area ralt of severaldemographic factors such as nonmarital and marital
ftity rates and marriage rates. Among whites, the increase in the nonmarital birth ratio is due to
both increasesinthe notital ftity rate and decreases in marriage. Among blacks, it is primarily
the dmrease in marriage that has driven up the nonrnarital birth ratio (Ventura et al 1995).-13-
POVW rates are higher a~ng female headed householh than any other group.
Table 5 presents poverty rates amongffies by age ofthe head of household and family type
in 1993, based on a tabulation of the March 1994 Current Population Suney (CPS). The poverty
rate among female headed households with children was about 46 percent compared to 9 percent
among two-parent families. High poverty rates among female headed households with children are
not limited to minority groups: 41 percent of white, as well as 58 percent of black and 61 percent
of Hispanicfemaleh~ed households are in poverty. Almost half of all ftilies in poverty are now
accounted for by faale headed householdsyet they ordy account for about 13percent of all families
reflectingthe growing trend toward the “feminizadonof poverty”, The table also shows that poverty
rates among elderly households are relatively low, 5.5 percent among families without children
headed by an elderly individual.
l fiblic assistance programs reach poor families with children
A discussedabove, resources for public assistance programs in the U.S. are primarily spent
on poor single parent ftilies with children and the elderly. This is reflected in Table 6 which
presents the percent of non-elderly ftilies in poverty who are participating in various public
assistance programs. Among the 3.9 million female headed households with childre~ 63 percent
receive ~C or general assistance, 87 percent receive some type of means tested benefits, and 14
percent receive no benefits at all. This can be contrasted to the 2.3 million two-parent families with
childrenin poverty where only24 percent receive cash assistance and 40 percent receive no benefits.
For the 1.1 million non-elderly ftilies without children who are in poverty filly 64 percent do not
receive any of these means tested benefits,
l Multiple program ptiipti”on is the rule, not the ~ception.
In-kind-W programs haveb~me increasinglyimportant for welfsre recipients. In 1992,-14-
86 percent of all AFDC recipients received Food Stamps and 96 percent received Medicaid (U.S.
House of Representatives, 1994).
l Morfomepa.nScip&n M anwngpublic assistance recipients we lower than among
those not receiving benefits.
Table 7 showsthat among poor femaleheaded householdswith children receiving cash means
tested benefits during 1993, ordy 32 percent worked during 1993, compared to 71 percent among
those not receivinganybenefitsand 87 percent among allfemaleheaded household with children with
incomes between 100 and 200 percent of the poverty line. Labor force participation rates are also
low among poor two parent ftilies on public assistance -- 43 percent of husbands and 23 percent
of wives receiving cash assistance worked compared to 83 percent of husbands and 50 percent of
wives who did not receive any benefits.I’Ilg
4. Expected Effects of Public Assistance on Labor Supply and Family Structure
The standard model used to evaluate the work incentives of welfwe programs is a static
income-leisure model. In that model, individuals choose a level of work effort by maximizing the
utility of income and leisure subject to a budget constraint which takes into account the tw and
transfer progam(s) that are being examined. Figure 6 presents a simplified version of the budget
constraint H by an AF’DCparticipant. In the absence of AFDC benefits, the person receives only
their esmed inwme, andtheir budget opportunities are represented by ACDE, with a slope equal to
the wage rate w. The AFT3Cprogram provides a maximum benefit of G, called the “guarantee”, but
introduces a BRR of twhere for each additionaldollarinearned income, the AFDC benefit is reduced
by tdollars. Income opportunities in the presence of the AFDC program are then represented by
ABDE and the slope ofthe AFDC budget segment isw(f-fl. The maximum benefit level and the tax-15-
rate mmbine to create a break-even level of income where benefits are zero. Below the break-even
point the household can receivepositivebenefitsand above the break-even level the household is not
eligible.
The primary policy parameters are the guarantee and the benefit reduction rate. Increasing
the guarantee causes a reduction in labor supply, through a pure income effect. Changes in the tax
rate, like changes in wages, generate both income and substitution effects, and the net effect is
ambiguous. Figure 6 illustratesthe effi of increasing the BRR to 100% represented by ABCE, By
reducingthe net wage horn w(I-?) to zero, the cost of leisure of is reduced and, hence, through the
substitutioneff~, labor supply decreases. The income effect associated with an increase in the tax
rate, by reducing income at a givenlevelof hours, leadsto lower levels of work effort. However, the
total eff=t of a welfme progr~ by establishing a guarantee and tax rate leads unambiguously to
lower levels of work effort.
A change in the guarantee or tax rate not only changes the incentives for work for existing
recipients but it also changesthe imposition of the recipient population through entry and exit, and
it tiects the labor supply of new entrants (Moffitt 1992a; Levy 1979). For example, a decrease in
the BRR from 100to 67 percent mayincreasework among current recipients. But reducing the BRR
will increase the break-even level of inmme which will lead to increases in entry into the program.
Some new entrants will decrease their labor supply in response to the reduction in the BRR and
others will leave their labor supply unchanged but may be eligible due to the program expansion.
Ashenfelter(1983) callsthese two caseloadeffectsthe “behavioral”and “mechanical” effects. A third
group of new entrants may have been eligible even before the program’s expansion but were not
participating due to lack of knowledge about the progr~ or because of ‘costs of participation
(MoW 1983). This is a potentially important group as the take-up rate is estimated to be between-16-
45 and 65 percent for female heads of household (Moffitt 1983, Blank and Ruggles 1996). The
overall change in the labor supply of female heads depends on the relative magnitudes
participants and new entrants.
of existing
The EITC progr~ in contrast to the AFDC program, is designed explicitly to subsidize
employment. Figure 7 showsa stylizedbudget constraint for the EITC program. The main strength
of the EITC is that in contrast to AFDC, theory predicts unambiguous increases in labor force
participation rates. For individuals out of the labor market, both the income and substitution effects
of the EITC are positive and provide an incentive to enter the labor market. For those already in the
labor market, the work incentives of the EITC program depend on which of the three segments of
the budget mnstraint the fdy is on. In the subsidy region of the credit, over segment AB, the net
wage increasesto w(I+Ic) where #cis the credit rate. In the flat region of the credit (segment BC),
the net wage is w. In the phase out region of the credit (segment CD), the net wage decreuses to
w(l-~) where @is the phase out rate. For persons inthe subsidy range of income, the substitution
eff~ is positivebut the inmme eff~ is negativeleadingto an ambiguous total effect. In the flat and
phaseout ranges of the credit, work effofi unambiguously decremes.lg These negative effects on
hours worked have the potential to be significant as about 70 percent of recipients have incomes in
the flat or phase-out ranges of the credit @lssa and Liebma~ 1996).
Utiortunately, the world ismuchmore compli~ed than that presented in the stylized figures
above. F% there are mdtiple programs that women are eligible for (and other taxes that they face)
which amplicate the budget co-. For example,ifMedicaidbenefits are dropped when a family
loses eligibilityfor AFDC, then a very high marginal tax rate is generated at this so called Medicaid
“notch”. Second, bwause of allowable deductions to earnings, the effective tax rate faced by these
women will typically be lower than the statutory rate of 67 to 100 perwnt. Third, the static model-17-
does not take into account the long term implications for current work effort, for example, through
l
augmenting human capital and [eading to higher fiture wages. Lastly, while two-parent families
represent a smallfraction of AFDC participants(8 percent) they represent almost one-half of all EITC
recipients (U.S. House of Representatives, 1994;Eissa and Liebman, 1993). The discussion above
presents the simple case of one potential earner in the family. The incentives of these programs are
more complicated with two possible earners inthe ffily.20
The theoreticaljustification for the adverse effects of the welfare system on family structure
are straightforward. Fwst,sincethe inceptionof the AFDC program, benefits for two-parent families
have been non-existent or limited. Because of unequal treatment of single and two-parent families,
the U.S. we~e systemprovidesincentivesto divorce,separate, and delay marriage and remarriage.21
Second, for the same reasons, the welfme system provides an incentive for out-of-wedlock
childbearing. Third, the benefit levels provided in most welfare programs increase with the size of
the family. For example, in 1993, a single mother livingin California with one child would receive
an increase in her AFDC benefit of$117 (from $490 to $607) if she had an additional child.
Because the E~C provides benefits to both married and single parent families, it appears to
carry less of a marriage penalty compared to AFDC. But if both parents are working there maybe
gains to splitting the family into two units if each can obtain the credit.22
The economic model underlying most studies of the impact of we~~e programs on family
structure is founded in work by Becker on maritrd formation and dissolution (Becker 1973, 1974,
1981). Becker’s model is based on the proposition that a woman will choose marriage when the
economic benefits (or utility) inside marriage exceed the economic benefits outside marriage,
Implications of this model are that increases in the earnings or wages of the potential spouse will
increase the probability of marriage while increases in any benefits available outside marriage (such-18-
as welfare benefits) will decrease the probability of marriage. By the same argument, increases in
benefits increase the probability of having another child or having a child out of wedlock.
5. Effects of Welfare On Labor Supply and Family Structure: Lessons from the
Literature
The empirical literature on the incentive effects of welfwe programs is largely based on
evidence from three sources. The first source is differences in programs across states at a point in
time. The second source is changes in programs over time. Empirical analyses using this type of
variation can take the fom of aggregate time series analysis, pooled cross-section analysis or studies
usingpanel data. Examplesused in the literature include changes in the BRR in the AFDC program
in 1968 and 1981, changes in benefit levels over time, and expansions in the EITC and Medicaid
programs. Studiesusing these two sources of variation are usefi.din determining how labor supply
or family structure might change in response to changes in benefits or tax rates. Ultimately we are
interested in not ordythese marg”nal effects but also how the existence of the programs themselves
affects the outcomes of interest. We have very little program variation which allows us to observe
suchchanges directly. Thus the existing studies are limited in their ability to make predictions about
eliminating programs, These issues will be discussed in the context of welfwe reform in a later
section.
The third source is state level demonstrations or experiments. State experimentation with
welftie programs is typically done in a classical experiment setting with random selection into
treatment and mntrol groups. The policychangeinthese cases isnot limited to tinkering with benefit
and tax rates but typically involves changing some other aspect of eligibility or participation. This
sectionwillwncentrate on evidencethe@ two sources. State experiments will be discussed in the-19-
next section.
M us begin with a simpleexaminationof the time seriestrends inprogram generosity. Figure
8 presents trends in benefits in the AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid programs over the last 25
years.n The most strikingfti inthis figureisthe dramatic declinein AFDC benefits since late 1960s.
The rd value ofthe AFDC guarantee dropped by almost 50 percent during this period, with benefits
continuallyin decline,asidefromthe 1982-1988 period when benefits were largely unchanged. The
introduction of in-kind benefit programs in the late 1960s and early 1970s moderated the decline in
AFDC benefits in the early part of the period. The cash value of AFDC and Food Stamp benefits,
as shownbythe linelabeledAFDC&FS,declinedby about 30 percent over the period. This is in part
due to the fact that Food Stamp benefits are adjusted annually for changes in food prices, where
changes inAFDC have to be authorized by state legislatures. Despite the fact that real wages have
also declined over much of this period, benefit to wage ratios exhibit similar trends to real benefits
shown in Figure 8 (Hoynes and MaCurdy 1994). Average state Medicaid expenditures for female
headed households has increasedsomewhat over the period, whic& if valued by households as cash,
would firther moderate, but not reverse, the fdl in AFDC benefits.”
If labor supply and family structure decisions are sensitive to the financial inducements of
welfiue programs, then one would expect the dramatic changes in benefits shown in Figure 8 would
be associated with changes in outcomes, Comparing the trend in benefits to the trends in female
headship(Figure 4) and nonmarita.1births (Figure 5), it appears that benefits tracked these trends in
ffily composition until the mid 1970s. Since the% real benefits have declined wMe the headship
rate and birth rates have mntinued to increase. In additio~ time series trends in labor supply and
hom worked among f~e heads of household do not appear to track trends in AFDC tax rates or
benefitlevels(Moffitt 1992a). This approac~ while illustrative, is not wnclusive bmause there may-20-
be other ftiors that have changed over this time period which, tier taking them into account, may
result in significant incentive effects of the welfare system. Further, comparing contemporaneous
benefits with outcomes may not be appropriate. This maybe particularly true for family structure
decisionswhere welfwe maytii these decisions with a significant lag, possibly through effects on
long run norms, This has not been addressed in the literature.25
The remainderof this bon summarizes empirical studies on the effects of existing welfare
programs on labor supply and family structure and will rely on existing reviews whenever possible,
The vast majorityof the literature has examined the incentive effects of the AFDC program. This is
probablythe result of manyfactors. Fir% in-kindprograms were not introduced until the mid 1960s,
some 30 years after the AFDCpro- and for sometime were significantly smaller than the AFDC
program. Smnd, AFDC benefits vary dramatically across the states, whereas Food Stamp benefits
and, to a certain extent, Medicaid do not. Lastly, examining in-kind benefits ofien requires making
assumptions about how these benefits are valued by the household. Are they equivalent to cash and
thus can enter directly in the budget constraint used in static labor supply analysis? Food Stamp
benefits are likely to be ifiamargina.1 and, hence, can be treated as cash transfers (Moffitt 1989).
Medicaid benefits are much more difficult to value because of their insurance component,
or S*
Static labor supply theory predicts that the existence of the AFDC program unambiguously
leads to lower levels of labor supply among potential recipients. One of the main goals of the
literature is to determine by how much labor supply is reduced among female heads of household.
Thisis inherentlydi5dt to measure sinceit requiresout of sample prediction. Danziger et al (1981)
and Moffitt (1992a) provide surveys of the literature and report that most studies find non-trivial
disincentiveeffms. Ove@ estimatesshowthat the introduction of AFDC leads to a 10-50 percent-21-
reduction inlabor supplyfrompre-transfw levels. While the upper end of the disincentive effects are
large, predicted levelsofwork effort among program participants in the absence o/the pro~am still
remainvery low mmpared to other female heads of household. The result is that, in the absence of
AFDC benefits,earningswould remain sufficientlylow that filly 95 percent of previous participants
would have incomes low enough to retain eligibility under the program and ftiy income levels
rarely are raised to the poverty level (Moffitt 1983). Hoynes (1996a) examines the effect of AFDC-
UP on the lsbor supply of two-parent ftilies and finds somewhat larger disincentive effects where
husbands and wivw reduce hom worked by about 80 percent from pre-transfer levels. This may in
part be explained by higher wage opportunities and greater work experience levels among these
recipients. Page (1995) examines the effect of the FSA’Sexpansion of AFDC-UP and finds labor
supply eff~s consistent with Hoynes (1996a).
The available evidence suggests that average levels of labor supply of female heads of
household are not sensitiveto changesinthe bentit reduction rate in the AFDC program. While the
studiesfind that increases in BRR lead to moderate and significant increases in labor supply among
recipients,they are off~ by decreases by new entrants responding to the increase in the break-even
levelof income (Danziger et al 1981,Moffitt 1992x Hoynes 1996a). This does not necessarily imply
that wage elasticitiesare low, but that ent~ eff~s may also be important. Because statuto~ levels
of benefitreduction rates are constant across states, these studies typically identfi the tax effect off
of differences in effective ~ rates or wages. Examination of the time series variation in B~
through the reduction 100to 67 percent in 1968andthe increase backup to 100 in 1982, also shows
no effw on labor supply (Moffitt 1992a).
The majorityof we&e tipients do not receive ody AFDC payments but also receive Food
Stamps, Medicaid and, in about a third of the cases, subsidized housing, Only a handfil of studies ,,
.,,’-22-
have taken into account these programs in estimating the work disincentives of welfare benefits.
ove~ these studies showrather modest effms of in-kindprograms. Fraker and Moffitt (1988) find
that the Food Stamp program reduces labor supply among female heads of household by about 10
percen< and that the mmbined impact of Food Stamps and AFDC reduces labor supply by about 21
percent. Blank (1989) andWtier (1991) use cross state variation in average Medicaid expenditures
and find very small work disincentive effects. Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) estimate a family specific
value for Medicaid based on the health status of the family and find significantly larger effects on
labor supply. Keane and Moflitt (1996) consider the combined impact of AFDC, Food Stamps,
Medicaid and public housing, and find a modest work disincentive. In their analysis, however, they
treat public housingas an entitlement, Painter (1995), accounting for rationing of public housing by
controlling for average waiting times across public housing authorities, finds that ignoring housing
benefits leads to an underestimate of the disincentive effects of 46 percent.
One of the most significant changes in in-kind programs is the severing of the link between
AFDC receipt and Medicaid eligibilitythat has taken place in the past 10 years. This has occurred
through expandingMedicaid eligibilityto childreninfties with inmmes exceeding AFDC eligibility
thrmholds and providingup to one year of Mdlcaid ~verage to families who leave AFDC for work.
Yelowitz (1995) iinds that expsndingMedicaidmverage to children at levels above AFDC eligibility
levels, increased labor force participation rates by 1 percentage point among all female heads of
househol~ and reduced AFDC participationraw by 1.2percentage points. The transitional benefits
may not significantly influence we~we to work decisions as very few families have actually taken
advantage of this program (EIlwood and Adarns 1990).
In sum, the available evidence suggests that welfare programs do create a modest work
disincentive,but that the existence of the programs do not completely explain the very low levels of-23-
work effort among weke participants, compared to non-participants. For example, Moflitt (1983)
finds that AFDC benefits explain only about one-half of the difference in hours worked between
female headed participants and non-participants. Hoynes (1996a) finds that AFDC-UP benefits
explainone-third of the difference among participating and non-participating married men and one-
half of the difference among married women. This maybe because the studies have not controlled
adequately for recipients’ poor work opportunities or other costs of going to work, or it may be
explained by differences in tastes for work.
The empirical studies of work incentives of the EITC program have made use of the
tremendous expansion of the progr~ both in terms of the size of the credit and the range of
eligibility, which has take place over the past 10years. First, the expansion of the credit as part of
the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA86) increased the credit rate from 11 percent to 14 percent and
increasedthe maximumcredit from $550to $851 (U.S, House of Representatives, 1994). Eissa and
Liebman (1996) fid that the ~86 expansion led to a 2.8 percentage point increase in the labor
force participation rate for single mothers, or a change of about 4 percent. As expected, they found
the responses to be concentrated among lower education groups with an increase of 6 percentage
points for those with lessthsn a highschooleducation. Theyfound no significant effects of the EITC
on hours worked for any group. They discuss several reasons which could explain the lack of an
effect for hours of work. If the phase-out rate does not generate large distortions, then the
deadweight loss associated with the program is potentially much lower than expected. Overall,
however, Eissa and Liebman’sestimated labor supply response was relatively small compared to the
cost of the credit’s expansion -- about $23,000 per new worker.
Dickert et al (1995) combined labor supply elasticities from the literature with their own
estimates of the elasticity of labor form pwicipation to examine the effects of the 1993 EITC-24-
expansion. Their resuks implyan increasein labor force participation rates of 3.3 percentage points,
or 6 perwnt, for singlemothers and 0.7 permntage points for primary earners in two-parent families.
In contrast to Eissa and Liebmq they find the entry effect to be offset by significant reductions in
hours of work among those already in the labor market. However, they find overall significant net
positive effects of the credit on hours of work.2b The cost of the expansion of the credit is paid for
with a reduction inthe AFDCcaseload for single parents, but no cost savings occurs for two-parent
families.
Family Formation
The early literature on the effects of AFDC on female headship is based primarily on state,
SMS~ dr citylevel analyses. The results from this literature are mixed and find no strong evidence
that AFDChas a si@cant effect on female headship decisions (Goeneveld et al 1983). The more
recent cross-sectional evidence, reviewed byMoffitt (1992a), shows a significant and positive, but
modest, effect of welfare on female headship, remarriage and divorce. These studies, however, are
based on cross state variation in welfare benefits and may be biased if there are omitted state
characteristics which are.correlated with welfwe benefits. For example, a state which is more
accepting of non-traditional ftiy structures may favor a higher level of support for female headed
households. This positive correlation between benefits and unmeasured characteristics would lead
to a upward bias in the estimated welfwe effect, Moffitt (1994) and Hoynes (1995) find that after
controlling for state and individual fixed effects, the wefire effect is small and not statistically
significant. Wirdcler(1995) fids that the FSA’Sexpansion of AFDC-UF to all states did not lead
to significantincreasesin marriage, Together this evidence suggests that marriage decisions are not
sensitive to financial incentives.
The literature on the eff~ of w~e on out-of-wedlock births is also quite conclusive. Acs-25-
(1995) and Mffitt (1995) provide recent reviews of the literature on the effects of welfare on
nonmaritslbirths. Overall,these effectsare often insi~ficant, and when they are not, they are small.
Larger effms are found for whites where, on average, a 10 percent increase in benefits leads to a 5
permt increase inthe notital birth rate (Acs 1995). All but one study found insignificant results
for blacks. All but a few of these studies rely on cross-state variation and the estimates are very
sensitive to the other state controls which are included (Moffitt 1995). As with female headship,
unmeasured state characteristicscan potentiallybias the estimated welfare effect. Ellwood and Bane
(1985) and Jackson and K.lerman(1995) look at changes over time within states and control for state
characteristics and find no eff~ ofwelfareon nonmarital births for blacks or whites. There are only
a fw studieswhich examinethe eti ofwelfareon subsequent births and none of them have found
a positive effect (Acs 1995).
6. Evidence from State Experiments
The studies discussed in the previous section use differences in policy across states and/or
over time to estimate the effects of welfue programs on labor supply and family structure. An
additional source of Wormation which is risiig inimportance,isthe evidence based on the evaluation
of state experimentation with AFDC programs. Experimentation typically takes the form of setting
up demonstration projects in selected localities within the state where a relatively small group of
randomly chosen welftie recipients are randomly assigned to treatment or control groups. Within
this classical experiment setting, the effwts of the policy change or ‘treatment’ is measured as the
Weren= inthe outmme of interest between the treatment and control groups (Hausman and Wise,
1985). The policy chmges considered within this setting are becoming increasingly diverse and
includechanges inparticipationrequirements, eligibility,and benefit formulas. This section presents-26-
a short historyon state experimentation with the AFDC progr~ and discusses the implications for
the current discussion on the incentive effects of welfare programs.
The roots of state experimentation with the AFDC program are in the Social Security Act,
the legislationwhich establishedthe program. While states have control over setting of benefits and
inmme eligibilityrules,the Act also givesauthority to the Smretary of the Department of Health and
Human Servius to “waive sptied requirements of the Social Security Act pertaining to the AFDC
program in order to enablea State to carryout anyexperirnen@ pilot, or demonstration projects that
the Secretq judges likely to help in promoting the objectives of the program” (U.S. House of
Representatives 1994, p. 364).
me modern use of state ~ts beganwith the Reagan administration and has increased
steadily throughout the Bush and Clinton administrations. The expedients of the 1980s and early
1990swere primarilywhe to work programs which had job search work experience, job training
and education components. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981 had two major provisions
aimed at reducingthe AFDC caseload. First, it increased the BRR from 67 to 100 percent. Second,
it provided guidelinw for statesto engage participants in employment and training programs. These
guidelineswere not mandates, but provided an “OBRA toolbox” which states could use to imovate
(Greenberg and Wlseman 1992). By the end of 1989,24 evaluations were conducted on programs
within 19 states. Most of these programs took the form of mandatory job search programs for
eligibleadults in recipient families.m These programs were found to have a relatively small impact
on earnings, employment ~d the we~e caseload, The largest results were in the range of
decreasing AFDC participation by 5 perwntage points and increasing quarterly earnings by $100
(&eenberg and Wlseman 1992)and were concentrated inamong moderately disadvantaged recipients
(Gueron andPauly 1991).n hw ~st programsfbcusing on rapid plument generated greater cost-27-
benefit calculations relative to higher intensity higher cost progrms focusing on training and
education (Gueron and Pauly 1991).
Despite the rather modest impact ofthe OBRA demonstrations, they had a significant impact
on welfare policy as reflected in the passage, in 1988, of the Family Support Act (FSA) (Wiseman
1991). The centerpiece of the FSA is the establishment an employment, education and training
program for AFDC recipients called the Job Opportunities for Basic Skills (JOBS) Program. While
the FSA requires that all states implement a JOBS progr~ there is considerable freedom for the
~tes in the design of a program, JOBS programstypidy mnsist of some combination of education
and training, job search and placement, and work experience. States have to decide, among other
things,how to allocate resources between low cost and highcost programs and to whom the program
will be targeted. Subject to available resources, however, participation is required among all non-
exempt recipients.~ In short, eligible recipients are expected to take jobs and participate in
employment sefices and the state is expected to provide services and the incentives to find
employment.
Overall, participation in JOBS programs has increased dramatically such that in 1992, 23
percent of eligible addts were participating (U.S. House of Representatives, 1994). The evaluations
of the state JOBS programs suggest that they have a modest impact on earnings, employment, and
weltie participation. In order to illustrate the effect of JOBS programs, ponsider the case of the
Greater Avenuesfor Education (GAIN) progr~ CaliforniaJOBS program which has been operating
sincethe mid-1980s and widelybelievedto be the most successful in the country. The most dramatic
results among all major JOBS evaluations in the country have been found for Riverside County, a
mixed urban-rural county located southeast of Los Angeles, which developed a low cost program
whichf~ses on immediatejob placement, Over a three year period, the G~ program increased-28-
employmentrates by 14percentage points, or twenty-fiveperwnt, and AFDC participation decreased
by about 13 percent (Riccio et al 1994). The overall reduction in government expenses relative to
the cost of the progrm was substantial:$2.84per $1.00 invested. However, more resource intensive
programs, focusing on education and training of long-term recipients in urban areas, found much
smaller results yielding negative returns to the program.30
Beginning in the early 1990s, state demonstrations advanced far beyond employment and
training programs. In Januaryof 1992,waivershad beenapproved for 15 projects in 9 states. At the
Bush Administration’s encouragement, 1992 brought more than 15 additional projects (Wiseman
1993).31 This has continued under the Clinton administration where more than 25 new or revised
planswere approved. The provisions being implemented as part of this waiver process affect nearly
evq facet of eligibility and benefit rules and include (1) provisions concerning two parent families
such as elimination of the 100 hour rule and work requirements for AFDC-UP participants; (2)
changes in the benefit formula such as reducing the benefit reduction rate, modi~ng allowable
deductions, and implementinga two-tier benefitschedulewhere benefitsare reduced after a fixed time
on the progrq (3) provisionsfor teens suchas establishingincentives for teens to stay in school and
livewith their parents; (4) imposiig a”- cap” whereby benefits are not increased if an additional
child is born while on wekare; (5) establishing incentives for paternity identification; (6) imposing
time limits on welfwe receipt; and (7) liberalizing asset tests. While the evaluations of these
demonstrations will provide important information for reforming AFDC, the programs are in their
infmcy and it is too early to include any information for this review.
The rise of experimentation at the state level is a significant trend in welfare policy. It is
important, however, to keep in mind the limitations for their use in designing nationwide, or even
statewide, weke policy. F@, sta~ demonstrationsare typi~ quite small in scale, and take place-29-
in select communitiesinthe state. me scale of the program limits the realization of possible macro
or communityfdback effectssuch as the effect of the program on labor markets, social norms and
tiorrnation diffusion(Garlinkel et al 1992). If the sites for the program are not randomly selected,
then the abilityfor wide scalereplicationisuncertain (Greenberg and Wiseman 1992). Second, most
of the current state demonstrations involve multiple changes to AFDC eligibility and benefits. For
example, the Wisconsin Parental and Family Responsibility Initiative (PFRI) is aimed at teenage
recipients and simultaneously imposes a partial family cap, liberalizes the treatment of deductions
agti earned income, expands benefits for two-parent ftilies by removing the 100 hour rule and
the work historyrequirements,and increasesthe incentivefor paternity establishment within one year
of a child’sbti ~lseman 1993). In these demonstrations, recipients inthe “treatment group” will
experience all of these changes and the evaluation of the program will show the net effect of all of
them on employment md welfme outcomes, This multiple treatment approach will make it very
difEcultto determine the relativebenefitsofthe viuious componentsof the law changes. Third, these
demonstrations are typicallyof a limited duration. Since the recipients in the treatment group know
this, they may be unlikely to make changes given uncertainty about fiture rules. This may be
partitiarly true for long-term decisions like marriage and having a child. Last, changes in eligibility
and benefits will change the overall generosity of welfare which may tiect entry into the program.
The demonstrations typidy are based on a sample of recipients and thus will not measure the entry
effect (Moffitt 1992b).
7. Welfare Reform, Wor& and Family Structure
Current webe reform proposals are motivated by a desire to achieve an overlapping set of
goals: reducing dependencyon the syst~ decreasinglongterm dependence, reducing program costs-30-
and caseload, enmuraging work enmuraging the formation of two-parent ftilies and discouraging
nonmarital childbearing. These goals are not new, in fact they underlie reforms to the system that
have been debated and to some extent implemented over the past 25 years. This section begins with
a taxonomy ofwekue reformspast and present. Some representfailed attempts at reform and others
represent changeswhich have been implemented at the state or nationwide level, This discussion is
not meant to be a wmprehensive history of welfwe reform but presents the main measures aimed at
enhancing the incentives to work and form two-parent families. The section concludes with a
discussion of the likely implications of current reforms using the evidence presented in the paper.
7.1 A Taxonomy of Welfare Reform
Let us begin with separating reforms into those insi& we~are and those outsi& we~are
(Ellwood 1988). Within those groups we will consider financial and non-financial measures.
Reforms Inside Welfare
Fl~ciallncentl es “v
Over the historyof the pro- ticial incentives have been the most common policy tool
used in attempting to increase work and decrease welfare dependency. Changes to tax rates and
benefit levels are the most prominent example of such a policy. The Negative Income Tax
experiments of the late 1960s and early 1970s represent the most significant, but unsuccessful,
attempt at reformingthe structure of benefit and tax rates.32 Other examples are the decrease of the
BRR in 1968 and its increase in 1982. Cument state experiments reflect a renewed interest in
tiecting work incentives through changes in benefit rules. Many states have received waivers to
implementdecreases in tax rates, changes in the treatment of deductions in calculating benefits, and
reductions in benefits.
Cumently, the use of financial incentives has expanded to enmurage the formation of two--31-
parent ffies and discourage nonmaritalchildbearing. “Familycap” provisions reduce or eliminate
additional AFDC benefits if a child was born while the mother is on aid. Another example is the
elimination of benefits for unmarried teen mothers urdess they live with their parents or providing
financial incentives to stay in school.
Thejustificationfor these reformsissimple. They place higher costs on undesirable behavior
relativeto desirablebehavior and their effectiveness depends on the sensitivity of individuals to these
financial incentives, or disincentives.
Cate~oricalEljmblll@ RulG
. . . .
Past reforms have expmded eligibility to two-parent families in order to encourage the
formation of two-parent families. The FSA requires that all states provide AFDC benefits to two-
parent Mes. In additio~ many states are experimenting with eliminating the 100 hour work limit
and work history requirements for the primsuyearner in the AFDC-UP family, which is an eligibility
condition imposed on two-parent fties but not single parents.
Current proposals limit eligibility in order to discourage nonmarital childbearing such as the
prohibitingunmarriedteen mothers fromreceivingAFDC, Another example of changing categorical
eligibilityistime titing benefits, thereby discontinuing eligibility after some fixed period of time on
we~e. These proposals, whilebeingdebated on nationalleve~are also part of the state experiments
now planned or in progress.
tirvice$
Moving from welfwe to work comrnordy results in two important sources of economic
hardshipinadditionto losingAFDCbenefits. Firstisthe mst of child care and second is the loss of
medid insurance through M~i@d: Bothoftheseissueswere addressed in the FSA. In order to
,,,,’,
make the transition to e~pl,o~bnt less m~ly, the FSA mandates 12 months of Medicaid coverage
,,; 5’ ., ,,:; ;,..~,;:,,,’ ,. ,,, :,, i: .,,.,!,. ,,,’ ,,.,,,, ,,$ ., ,,:, ,, ,‘J:,, ,-32-
for the ftily after leaving AFDC for work and establishes programs to subsidize the cost of child
care for working welfare recipients,
o Work Promam s
Welfwe recipientshave relativelylow education levels and limited work experience and skills
necessaryto tid employment. These shortcomings produce low earnings opportunities, and hence,
small or no gains from seeking employment. These facts have motivated the reforms requiring
participation of welftie recipients in mandato~ work programs (often known as “workftie”),
education andtraining programs; andjob search and placement programs. The goal of each of these
programs is to reduce the caseload through increased work effort. In workfare programs this is
achieved by providing work experience, while education and training programs expand wage
opportunities through increasinghumancapital. Job searchand placement programs reduce the costs
associated with job search and build skillsnecessary for successful interviews and job performance.
This reform has its roots in earlier legislation but culminated in the FSA which included provisions
requiringpficipation byallnon-exempt adults in state designed and run welfare to work programs.
Reforms Outside Welfare
~i~cialIncen ves ti
The use of financialincentiveshavebeenused primarily to increase the returns to work, The
most prorninengand most costly,of reformsimplementedoutsidethe welfare system is the expansion
in the EITC which has taken place over the past 10 years, The EITC is advanced as a partial
replacement of welfare by transferring income to poor ftilies while minimizing the work
disincentivesassociated with the program. Another example of this type of reform is increasing the
minimum wage.
fle~ti Cwe 4Chiti_-33-
When the Medicaid program was established, participation among families with children was
linked to AFDC recipiency such that when a family earned enough to get off AFDC, they also lost
their Medicaid coverage. Recent expansions in Medicaid eligibility have severed the link between
AFDC receipt and Medicaid coverage by providing coverage for poor children. In states with low
AFDC benefit levels, this has resulted in significant expansions of eligibility. The effect of these
expansions in the Medicaid program is to reduce both the cost of seeking employment and forming
two-parent families.
The FSA contained provisions designed to reduce dependency on welf~e by increasing the
role of the absent parent. The first element provides incentives for paternity establishment and the
second element establishes guidelines for setting child support payments and facilitating payment
collection.
7.1 Expected Effects of Current Reforms
Summarizingdecades of reformisnot easy,but the conclusionthat emergesfrom the evidence
presented in this paper is that tinkering with the system is not likelyto yield si@cant results. For
example, changes in the benefit reduction rate have not led to significant increases in work effort
(Moffitt 1992a) and the introduction and expansion of welfare to work programs has had positive
effects, but the results are modest and are not likely to generate huge reductions in the caseload
(Gueron and Pauly 1991). On the other hand, reforms outside AFDC such as expanding the EITC
and Medicaid may generate more sizeable increases in labor supply (Dickert et al 1995, Eissa and
Liebman 1996, Yelowitz 1995). In light of these findings, recent interest in reforming welfare
focuses on more dramatic changes to eligibilityand benefit rules. The current elements which are
focused on family structure include eliminating benefits for additional children while on welfare,
prohibitingor limitingthe availability of benefits for unma.nied teens, and firther expanding benefits-34-
for~o-pmentfties byelitiating additiond workrestritiions. Elements focused on decreasing
dependency and increasingwork include time limiting benefits and liberalizing the benefit formula to
increase the returns to work.33
Each of these reforms havebeen discussedin the mntext of nationwide changes to the AFDC
program. Whilethere isno mnsensus that hasyet emerged,the waiver process has resulted in states
experimentationwith virtually all of these provisions. As discussed earlier, it istoo early to present
redts horn this state experimentation. Instead what canwe mnclude about the likely effects of these
reforms on labor supply and fdy structure using the available empirical evidence?
The available evidence suggests that family structure decisions are not sensitive to financial
incentives. Thus the provisionsaimedat diwuraging nonmaritalbirthsand female headship will have
very smallimpacts. However, it is important to note that this conclusion is based on empirical
evidence which uses cross-state differences or over time changes in benefit levels to estimate the
program’s~~ on familystructure. One should exercise caution when using studies to evaluate the
eff- of a change policy (e.g. eliminating a program for a subgroup) which has not been observed
in previous data. Eliminating work requirements for two-parent families on AFDC-UP is not likely
to lead to significant increases in marriage rates as the existing constraints are not binding for most
couples (Hoynes 1996a) and the expansion of the AFDC-UP program as part of the FSA did not
si@cantly affect family structure decisions ~[rdder 1995).
Implementingtime tits for AFDCreceiptislikelyto yieldmixedresults. If a five year limit
is impo~ 3545 percent of new we~e entrantsor three-quarters of the existing welfare population
willbe affmed (Pavetti 1995;EUwood1986). Employment prospects for these long-term recipients
are limited as over half enter wekue with no work experience and over 60 percent have less than a
high school education @avetti 1995). Recent experience with eliminating Michigan’s general-35-
assistanceprogramalsompports the claimthat women mayhave dif6culty finding employment, Two
years tier male GA recipients were removed from the roles, ordy 20 percent had found steady
employment (Datiger and Kossoudji 1995).U Further, the employment outcomes of AFDC
recipients may be very sensitive to local economic conditions (Hoynes 1996b). Together, this
evidence suggests that ftiy incomes could fall dramatically if time limits were implemented.3s On
the other hand, using tidence fromFrance, Hanratty (1994) estimates that time limiting benefits for
single mothers has increased labor force participation rates by 11percentage points, an increase of
twenty-five percent. This is based on a means tested program much like the AFDC progrm except
that eligibilityends when the youngest childturns age 3. These results may have limited applicability
for the United States as France also provides universal medical care and high quality free nursery
school and day care programs (Hanratty 1994).
Changing benefits formulas to increase work incentives are likely to generate minimal
increases in labor supply. This is one area where we do have a significant body of evidence, and
collectively it suggests that marginal changes to implicit tax rates faced by welfare recipients is not
likelyto have significant effects on labor supply (Moffitt 1992a). Increasing returns to work within
welfwe may increase labor supply for current recipients but this is likely to be offset by reductions
in labor supplyamong new entrants onto the program, Eliminating the 100 hour rule for two-parent
fiuniliesnot ordytiers the evening of the playingfield between single and two parent families but
also is designed to eliminate the inherent work disincentive that it creates. Hoynes (1996a), by
estimatingthe structud parameters of household utility finctioq is able to examine the implications
of eliminationof the 100hour de and fids that it islikelyto increase labor supply among AFDC-UP
recipients without significantly increasing the program caseload. However; since participation in
AFDC-UP is still very low, this is unlikely to have a significant impact on the income of the poor.-36-
8. Summary and Policy Recommendations
This paper has explored the validity of the claims that our welfare system causes low levels
of work effort and highrates of femaleheadshipand nonmarital childbearing. While is it true that the
systemdoes provide adverse incentivesforthe formation of two-parent families, the empirical studies
show conclusivelythat the magnitude ofthese disincentiveeffects is very small, such that our welfare
systemcannot explain the high rates of headship and illegitimacy. The estimated work disincentive
effects of welfare programs are somewhat larger in size, and show that public assistance programs
explain about one-half difference in labor supply between pafiicipants and non-participants.
These results imply that current reforms aimed at reducing female headship and nonmarital
births such as “familycaps”, eliminatingbenefitsfor teens, and equaltreatment of two-parent families,
are unlikelyto generate large effis. Changesto implicittax rates and benefit formulas may increase
work among current recipients,but overall work effort may not be affected. Any changes which are
accompanied by resources for job search and training may generate larger effects, although these
programs alone are not a panacea. These predictions should be accompanied by a
Many of the proposed changes have never been implemented at the state or federal
word of caution.
level and require
out of sample predictions. Current state experimentation may help fill this gap.
As the importance of in-kind benefits continues to rise, we need to continue to examine the
implications of these programs on labor supply and family structure. In addition, as two-parent
fdes become an increasingly large minority of welfare recipients, more research should focus on
that group,-37-
Notes
1.k isalsoa concern that the structure of benefits in programs for the disabled also diswurage work effort. Thwe
issues will not be covered here.
2. Othermeans d pro- ming low income farnilim include school lunch programs, supplematnl food program
for women, infants ~ children (WIC), energy assistance, Head Start, and various training programs. Three programs
are small wmpared to those mentioned in the text d, accordingly, they have not -ived much attention in the
~. The other major public assisw programs in the U.S. are the Supplemeti Security Income (SSl) program
which serves lowb ekly d disabled - d - assistance (GA) programswhich serve primmily single
men. Low income familim also may receive social ~e benefits such w unemployment co-ation or sociat
security .
3.In addition to the net income test, gross family income must b less than 1.85 times the need standard, which is also
state~ and is typically lower than the maximum benefit level. The asse&test limits d and personal property,
excluding home equity and vehicle equity, to $1000. Unlike income limits, this is set federally.
4. Two-~ ties must satisfi two ~nditions not_ of single parents. First, the primary wage earner in the
family can not work more than 100 hours per month. This hours limitation is the origin for the term “unqloyd” in
AFDC-UP. Second, the primary wage ~r must dispky previous “signiticmt” attacht to the labor force.
Signili~ ~chment is typidy satisfied if the worker was employed and earned at l-t $50 in at lmt six of the last
ti ~ e, or was eligiile to -ive lmemployment mmpensation sotiime in the last yw. ktly, the
1988 FSA ~ that sw setup AFDC-UP programs, but allows _ to limit benefits to 6 months per year.
5.111 addition to the stnndnrd deduction, one can also dti child care expenses. in 1993 the maximum child care
deduction was $200 per child per month for ~ less ti two and $175 for children over two.
6,s- iu 1994, a small E~C WM made avWle to childl=s workers ages 25@ with earnings up to $9,000.
7. States a, and many do, cover children at higher time levels than required by Congress,
8.Other housing programs serving low income households include rural housing programs, programs serving
ho-wners, and f- programs.
9. ~ include thecombti ~ of fti, state&W governments for a comprehensive set of means @ti
transferprograms including b m Table 2 plus many other smaller programs such as School Lunch Progmrns, student
loan programs, housing programs, andjob t- programs.
lo.lllis ~ iswon Edirl’srndepth~ “ s with 50 fde Wed houshlds rec8iving AFDC and living
m Chicago. None lived on welfare alone aralmany WOW off the books b legitimate jobs d a few ~ivd income
b drugs or proati~ion. Ithtick~~fi~-bg-tibti~ti~C caseload wbich
is very h~rogeneous, Most s- have developui tiking systems which link welfare case fles to @erly
-* ~ _ -. ~ * ~ work in the coved s=tor but does not address work
in undem ~nomy.
11,Eeumse a minori~ of AFDC recipients -ive housing benefib, they are not considered here. Including housing
benefits wouti inc~e the estimated tax rates.
12,1n 1990, tw~-sevm - of working poor families@ for child care and spent, on average, 33 percent of family
income on child ~ (Hofferth et al, 1991). Urbm welfare recipi* are more likely to have to pay for care
(Mathematical Policy Research, 1988).-38-
lq.While the tnx mte is w f-, California &d permission from the Department of Health and Human Services
to extend the 30 and 1/3 rule past the four month limit. The lower b rate was made permanent in September 1993.
14.The b rate iscalculatd as one minus the change ia disposable income over the change io earnings.
15.W _ range of the EITC @su a high MTR at high levels of work effort, but at the relatively low hourly
wage in this simulation, the woman never reachea the phase out range of the ctiit.
16.Note that in the top panel of Table 4, the MTR of going from part-time to fult-tirne work inc~a substantially
~ $5.CK) @ $7.50 per hour wage rote. This is because the worker ~ enough to move into the pke-out range
of the EITC, where the tax rate is over 20 percent.
17.b figuw report what fraction workd at all last yw among all those receiving welfare lwt year. Employment
rates among wrrent recipients are quite a bit lower.
18.lt is well recognized that these differences between recipients and non-r~ipienta should not be interptied as a
disincentive effect of welfare he families maybe self-selti in the welfare recipient group (Moffitt 1983).
19 .In the flat range there is only an time eff~, leading to lower levels of work effort. IOthe pbaamut range, the
~ m the_ wage leads to lower work effort by decreasing the -to work (substitution effd) d incr-ing
time holding work effort constnnt (income effect).
20. For example while the EITC ~ti labor force @icipation for single parenta, it not necessarily valid for
~ qb. Depending on the time of the primary earner in the family, the incentives for the secondary earner
my be to * hours (or -). ~ ~ may tlvmbe substituting for inwme thnt othetie the s~ndary earner
in the household would have mntrii.
21 .Actually, AFDC provida dia-ives to live tith the -d father of the children, regdless of marital status.
. .
~ with an unrelatedmale is M quite leniently in terms of eligibility and t~nt of his income. Further,
in many s-, marrying a ronn unrelated to the child~ does not tiect eligl%ility or benefit levels. The rul~ aod
incentives for whabition and marriage is discussed at length in recent work by Moffitt et al (1995).
22.For an illustrativeexample,seecommentsto tis paperbyNadaElssa.
23.AFDcwm~ asb wei- av~ge of maximum benefit levels for a family of four in the 50 stata,
using the caseload as the weight. AFDWFS is the combined value of AFDC and Food Stamp benefits and is equal to
70%of the mluimum AFDCtiplus the FdStnmpmaximum benefit. The 70% results from AFDC income being
“taxed” m ~ ti Fd Stamp M ~ - are average benefits within by state for a family of four.
The AFDCdata~fium-liaW tables hti FtunilySupport~ ion, De-t of Hdth and Human
Services. The Food Stamp data ~ from relished tiles from the Food and Nutrition Service, Department of
Agriculhue.TheMedi4 datawere provided by RobertMoffitt.
24.If the value of Medicaid to timil.iw is equal to k averageexpenditure then the wmbined benefits in the
three programs increased somewhat up until the mid 197@, declid until the late 1980s,and increased
somewhatat theendof theperiod.
25.One exceptionis Murray (1993],whoexaminesaggregatetrendsin nonmaritalbirths and finds higher
mrrelation withwelfarebenefitswhena longlagisused.
~.h order to perform this calcuhion, Dickert et al assume that new entranta in the labor market work 20 hours per
wee4c, for 20 weeks in the yeiu.-39-
27. Siogle pnrents with children under the age of six were usually excluded from the requir~.
28 .These program effects, and all the other evidence in this section, is derived from comparisons of outcomw in the
trhnt group to outwmes in the control group.
29.Amongthetivti who are exe# from @c~on m JOBS programs include those with a child less than three,
those who are sick or are caring for a sick family member, or those residing in an area where services are not being
provided (U.S. House of Representatives, 1994).
30.’Ilm program m Meda q, containing the city of Oakland, generated a am of $0.45 per $1.00 spent on the
progmm while Los Angeles county g-rated a benefitto cost ratioof $0.26 (Riwio ~ al 1994).
31.Aade6criiinwiseman (1993), Bush stmsed the importance of innovation at the state level and Promisd that the
waiver -s would become more st~ and 1w13arduous for state welfare officials.
32.LikeA.FDC, a negative - tax ~ progmm is ctiterized by two param~rs: the benefit guarant~ and the
benefit reduction ti, The income ~ experiments took placeI in four citiw where several alternative
mmbinations of benefi leve4s atr.1tax ratea were impleti. There are many sources which provide overviews of the
experiment and the many outcomes sludied, for example s= Munnell (1987).
3q.One significant eleinent in current welfare refom discussions is to convert the AFDC program into a block grant
Whichisatothe states toestabliah tbeirownprogmms, Ifimpl~, thisislikely tocausemany changesto
ti nation’s welfare system as the entitlement nature of the program is eliminated. However, the implications for labor
supply and Hy stmctnre is diflicult to discuss until we see how states respond. See Sawbill (1995) for a gmeral
discussion of the implidons of block @ d Quigley d Rubinfeld (1996) for a discussion of the likely state
response.
34.’Ihis group maybe mom@ ready than AFDC recipients as over ~rs had some previous work experience
A all are childless. Their rates of disability were high, however, as reflected by the fact that one third of the group is
now ~iving disability benefits (Danziger and Kossoudji 1995).
35.Some plans for time limiting benefits would provide for a public sector or subsidized job for those unable to find
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~: U.S. H-of ~ “Ves(1994), social security ~ h Servim ion (1995), ~ional Researc
(1993) arKI+1.is~ datn h the Food eIKINutrition Servim.
Notes:
1. ~ of the6e~ are also available to b elderly and cWleas familiea. Unlas ~ s-, the figures
~ to ~ M, not just the benefits forthenon-elderly.Expenditi titi federidd sw ata.
2. Cost of EITC inch the tax ex~~ associatedwith the credit and ~ the decrease in tiividual tax
rec8i* due to the credit, d the retied portion.
3. Figures for 1993 are proj~ions.
4. -ti&tititi _~ti~4a~8~ p~hlW5-lB2.
5. Fi~ in ti final mb arefor 1992.
6. Iucti_ofbeneti to AFDC~tiordy.Table 3
Annd Income,Expenses and Tm Rates Faced by a Rep=ntative Welfare Rtipient in 19931
C~omia AFDCBenefls wtih30and1/3 Ruk
No work Part-Time Work 2 Full-time Work 3
mgs $0 $5,200 $10)400
EITC o 1,014 1,511
7,284 5,817 3,391
Food Stamp Eenefits 1,355 1,015 %3
Cb.ild care o 1,040 2,080
Work Expenses o 520 1,040
Other Federal Taxes o 0 0
PayroU Taxes o 398 7%
SM Taxes o 0 0
Disposable _ 8,639 11,088 12,349
Avemge Tax Rate, km no work4 52.9% 64.3%
Average Tax Rate, from ~~ 4 .- 75.8%
Nok:
1. ~ simulation is for a single mother living with two children in California -g $5.00 per hour. Child
care expenses are 20 percent of earnings ami other wo* ex~es are 10 percent of euunings. AFDc benefits
are c4dculat0dusing tbe 30 d 1/3 rule.
2. 20 hours per week.
3. 40 bouraper wink.
4. Tax ~ calcti as one + the c-e in disposable ticome over tie change in earnings.Table 4
Average Tax Rates for a Representative WelfareReci@ent in 1993,
by Wage W and Preaenu of EITC Pro- 1
C~orn&a AFDC Programwtih30 and1/3Ruk
Work Transition
No work - Part-time - No work -
Part-time Full-time FM-time









Avemge Tav ties W Em
$5.acl 72.4% 85.3% 78.9%
$7.50 76.7 82.1 79.4
$10.00 78.9 71.4 75.1
$12.50 79.6 56.9 68.3
Notes:
1. Tbs stiion is baaed on a single mother living with two children in California. Child care expensa
are 20 percent of earnings arKIother work expenses are 10 pe- of earnings. AFDC benefits are
calculated using tbe 30 and 1/3 role. Part time work is 20 hours per w-k aod full time is 40 hours per
w-k. Tax - dcu~ as one minus tbe change in disposable income over b change in earnings.Table 5
Pewnt of Families in Poverty by Age of Headof Household and Family Type, 19931






































ti: Author’s tion of March 1994 ~ won Survey.
N-:
1. Basedon a sqle of primaryfamiliti only. k not inctie mndary families or unreti indivtim All
resulb are weighted.d
ITable 7
Labor Force Participation U Among Pare* in Poor Fare-,
By Family Type and Recei@ of Public &istance Benefits in 19931
Non-E&r~ F-s wfihCWen
Receipt of Public Assis~e Bene~
Any Means All Familiw 100%-
AFDC or Tested No 200% Poverty
GA btils 2 Benefits 3
. . .
r Force P~
Ftie Hd 32,8% 40.9% 70.8% 87.3%
Husband Wife Family
HusbarKI 45.4 61.6 83.4 91.8
Wife 22.7 32.4 49.7 60.4
S~: Author’s *ion of M-h 1994 CurrentPo@on Survey.
Notes:
1. Wonassmple of_ Wonly. Dti notinc~~ndary families or~~ individti. Receipt
of benefib is deteti et the household level. Non-elderly fnmilim are those Hed by sommne less than 65. M
hts ere wei-.
2. Inch receipt of APDC, general nssis~, food stnmps, Medid, or subsidti housing,
3. N~*anyoftik6ts listuiinnote3. Notethat family ~stillbe receiving other menns tested benefits
such as school lunches d energy S5SiS-.References
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